Posts Tagged ‘DC v Heller’

A Constitutional Right to Shoot People?

July 17, 2008

At the Volokh Conspiracy, Eugene Volokh and Orin Kerr are discussing whether DC v. Heller establishes a “Constitutional Right to Self-Defense.” I’m with Professor Kerr on this one: it doesn’t. My opinion is of course completely uninformed, but when the experts disagree, why shouldn’t the rest of us chime in?

In the Court’s opinion Justice Scalia certainly does talk at length about self-defense. But I don’t think he quite gets to the point of saying there is a Constitutional right to self-defense. I see it coming up in two different contexts, in two different sets of arguments.

The first is in Scalia’s discussion of the phrase “keep and bear arms,” and whether it had an exclusively military meaning, “to serve in an army or militia” or whatnot. Here Scalia seems to be arguing along these lines:

  • There are instances of the phrase “bear arms” explicitly meaning “have weapons for self-defense.”
  • “Self-defense” is not “serving in the military.”
  • Hence “bear arms” does not necessarily mean “to serve in the military.”

Now I disagree with this on a couple of counts, but that’s not important now; my point is that it has nothing to do with any Constitutional right to self-defense. The rest of Scalia’s self-defense references are more relevant. He cites a number of mostly 19th-century sources interpreting the second amendment as “protect[ing] an individuals right to use arms for self-defense.” And his opinion’s first holding is,

The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.

I can certainly see how someone might find a “Constitutional right to self-defense” there. But I don’t think that’s right. Scalia isn’t justifying a right to self-defense, he’s assuming one. Applying something like his own logic re the Prefatory Clause, I interpret the holding as meaning, “The 2A protects a right to use firearms for traditionally lawful purposes,” with the note that one of those traditionally lawful purposes is self-defense.

That may seem silly, but consider another “traditionally lawful purpose,” hunting. Much of the older precedent Scalia cites re self-defense applies equally well to hunting, but I don’t see anyone attempting to find a Constitutional right to hunt in his opinion. There are all sorts of laws restricting hunting, which doubtless annoy hunters, but which as far as I know are Constitutionally uncontroversial. One could argue that DC could put more restrictions on the storage of .30-06s than on handguns, elk-hunting not being a lawful purpose in the city itself.

And I don’t see much in Scalia’s opinion about what exactly a right to self-defense might entail. Presumably it would include shooting someone breaking into your home. But what else? Will someone interpret Heller as guaranteeing a right to concealed carry, so you can shoot muggers on the street? (I’m sure someone will, actually.) Can you shoot an attacker if running away is an option? How much discretion do states an municipalities have to regulate the right? In Texas it’s apparently acceptable to shoot suspicious-looking people in your neighbor’s yard; I doubt that would fly in Massachusetts. If there is a Constitutional right, it’s not very well-codified. (See also Jack Balkin for much better-informed commentary on the subject.)

Now if a self-defense case actually reached the Supreme Court I’m fairly sure Scalia would find a right to it, based on tradition and common law and precedent and other extra-Constitutional sources—not every right is a Constitutional right! He might even find one in the penumbras he generally so despises (it wouldn’t be the first time…). But he hasn’t quite done that yet.

Guns, Guns, Guns!

June 27, 2008

Everything that can be said about DC v. Heller was probably said yesterday, and will probably be said again today, so I’m not sure why I’m bothering with this post. That said:

First off, I am neither enormously pleased nor enormously disappointed with the decision—I’m a flaming liberal, but I also like guns, so my gut reaction to the actual result averages out to “meh.” I’m more interested in the argument itself, and in the spectacle of 157 pages of opinions (on top of untold volumes of academic articles and polemics and amicus briefs and—shudder—blog posts) trying to make sense of one short sentence.

I agree completely with Publius that Scalia and Steven’s dueling opinions, both allegedly originalist, are a great argument against originalism. In this case (as, I imagine, in many other less angry-making ones) I don’t see any reason to think there was any original intent—my takeaway from the existence of more explicit drafts of the 2A was that the result was a compromise specifically intended not to settle issues just like this—and insofar as there was one it’s no longer meaningful, being inextricably grounded in long-since abandoned notions, e.g. that standing armies are bad, that militias composed of more or less all able-bodied men are good, and that those able-bodied men are responsible for providing their own guns. The question “WWJD?”—What Would James Madison Do?—has no answer.

So what we get is, as Jack Balkin writes, “living constitutionalism” pretending to be “originalism.” Actually, I’d be less kind than Professor Balkin: what we get is Justices’ personal preferences pretending to be the results of impartial originalist reasoning. And of course Justices make lousy historians, cherry-picking only the bits that support their (necessarily ahistorical, see above) positions from a large, ambiguous, and confusing historical record. As Sandy Levinson writes:

If one had any reason to believe that either Scalia or Stevens was a competent historian, then perhaps it would be worth reading the pages they write. But they are not. Both opinions exhibit the worst kind of “law-office history,” in which each side engages in shamelessly (and shamefully) selective readings of the historical record in order to support what one strongly suspects are pre-determined positions. And both Scalia and Stevens treat each other—and, presumably, their colleagues who signed each of the opinions—with basic contempt, unable to accept the proposition, second nature to professional historians, that the historical record is complicated and, indeed, often contradictory. Justice Stevens, for example, writes that anyone who reads the text of the Second Amendment and its history, plus a murky 1939 decision of the Court, will find “a clear answer” to the question of whether the Second Amendment supports a “right to possess and use guns for nonmilitary purposes.” This is simply foolish. Justice Stevens pays no real attention to a plethora of first-rate historical work written over the past decade that challenges this kind of foolish self-confidence, as is true also of Justice Scalia.

DC v. Heller

March 18, 2008

Oral argument in DC v. Heller is today. Exciting stuff indeed! My prediction is that there will be a splintered decision, with the four “conservative” justices voting (possibly in several opinions, including a very short one from Justice Thomas) to let the appellate decision stand, the four “liberals” voting to remand, possibly with a range of instructions across several more opinions, and Kennedy endorsing something like the Solicitor General’s position (the moderation and sense of which has so offended the Administration), only more pompously; the result being 5-4 in favor of remanding, with muddy instructions to the lower courts.

I’ll see if I change that after the argument, or more precisely after I see what more intelligent and better informed people have to say about it.

UPDATE: No new thoughts, but a question: what happens if a majority (Kennedy and the liberals) decide to remand (but for different reasons), and a different majority (Kennedy and the conservatives) find an Individual Right to bear arms (but draw different conclusions from that finding)?  What precedent does that set?

Historians on the Second Amendment, cont.

February 13, 2008

I’ve read, or rather skimmed slightly more thoroughly than previously, the two aforementioned historians’ briefs in DC v Heller. And I revise more former pro-DC-side judgment: my sympathies are now with neither.

What struck me most was how similar the bulk of the two briefs were. Both discuss at length the history of the second amendment and its antecedents in the context of the lively discussion of militias and standing armies; lots of good detail in both. They “merely” draw different conclusions from that context: one that the second amendment guarantees that the federal government could not allow the militias to languish unarmed or underarmed, the other that the second amendment guarantees an individual right as a mechanism to an end (the militias again), and that the right survives even if the purpose does not. (I am of course oversimplifying, especially as regards the pro-gun brief, which also discusses “bearing arms” as a civic virtue. And I’m sure I’m missing important points).

I draw neither conclusion; as I’ve said before I think the result of the history is an interpretive mess. For at least two reasons: first, the fact that the major premise in the militia cluase no longer holds (decided, as some wag noted, in the case of North v South, 1865); and second, that the actual text was the result of much discussion and compromise–I have to assume that the Framers were no more unified in their views of the particulars of the 2A as any set of politicians are on anything, and the records cited by both briefs seem to me to support that. The current discussion of individual versus collective rights is, in my view, at best a feeble attempt to make sense of the history, and at worst an impediment to understanding it.